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Sandoval held inapplicable to nonjury trials
Under the rule established in People v. Sandoval,'6 evidence of
a defendant's past criminal, vicious, or immoral acts, offered to
impeach the defendant's credibility, may be excluded if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudicial
effect.'70 The development of this doctrine reflects a concern that a
jury may disregard a court's limiting instructions 17' and infer from
the evidence of prior bad acts that the defendant probably committed the crime in question. 72 Recently, in People v. Rosa, 73 the Crim-

inal Court, New York County, found this consideration to be absent
where the defendant is tried without a jury, and held that, in such
cases, the Sandoval doctrine is inapplicable. 7 '

"'34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413,

357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
110Id. at 373, 314 N.E.2d at 415, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The rule that evidence of a
defendant's past conduct is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing a defendant's propensity for criminal acts is designed to prevent convictions based on a defendant's commission of other crimes. People v. Goldstein, 295 N.Y. 61, 65, 65 N.E.2d 169, 170 (1946). Evidence
of defendant's prior bad acts may be admitted, however, for the purpose of impeaching a
defendant who has chosen to testify on his own behalf. E.g., People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73,
34 N.E. 730 (1893). Accordingly, there are competing interests for the trial court to consider
when deciding a Sandoval motion. On the one hand, the judge must evaluate the probative
value of the evidence on the issue of the defendant's credibility, and on the other, he must
evaluate the extent of unfair prejudice to the defendant. 34 N.Y.2d at 375, 317 N.E.2d at 416,
357 N.Y.S.2d at 854. Similarity of prior acts and remoteness in time of such acts to the crime
charged, and the relevancy of the prior criminal conduct to the question of veracity are factors
bearing on the probative value of the evidence. Id. at 376-77, 314 N.E.2d at 417-18, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 855-56.
The Sandoval Court approved the use of a pretrial motion to determine which of the
defendant's prior bad acts could properly be the subject of cross-examination, id. at 375, 314
N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854, and did not afford criminal defendants any new substantive rights, People v. Davis, 44 N.Y.2d 269, 275, 376 N.E.2d 901, 904, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431
(1978), since the scope of cross-examination had always been in the sound discretion of the
trial judge. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 374, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853;
see, e.g., People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). See generally Prince, Evidence, 1974 Survey of N.Y. Law, 26
SYRACUSE L. REv. 423 (1975); Note, The Dilemma of the Defendant Witness in New York:
The Impeachment Problem Half-Solved, 50 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 129 (1975). For a discussion
of what prior acts of a defendant are permissible subjects of cross-examination for impeachment purposes, see The Survey, 52 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 620, 684 n.302 (1978).
"I See, e.g., People v. Davis, 44 N.Y.2d 269, 376 N.E.2d 901, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1978);
People v. Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294, 366 N.E.2d 843, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1977); People v.
Wright, 41 N.Y.2d 172, 359 N.E.2d 696, 391 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1976).
" People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 376-77, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849,
855 (1974).
'73 96 Misc. 2d 491, 409 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem.,
65 App. Div. 2d 679, 409 N.Y.S.2d 919 (2d Dep't 1978).
"1 96 Misc. 2d at 491, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 117. It has been unclear whether the Sandoval
Court intended to extend its decision to nonjury trials since the Court employed the phrases
"triers of fact" and "jury or court." 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at
855. Since the Court approached the problem in terms of the limiting instructions to the jury,
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The defendant in Rosa was charged with harassing a police
officer,'7 5 a violation that does not require a jury trial.7 6 Prior to
trial, the defendant moved for a ruling on the issue "whether a
defendant being tried before a judge without a jury is entitled to the
application of the Sandoval doctrine.""' Relying on dicta in People
v. Davis,'7 Judge Hertz held that the procedural safeguards man-

dated by Sandoval are unavailable to a defendant who is tried without a jury.7 9 The Davis Court, in evaluating the adequacy of a trial
judge's limiting instructions, noted that "a jury's natural tendency"
is to ignore such instructions. 80 Thus, Judge Hertz reasoned the the
Sandoval doctrine was implicitly based on a court's inability to
insure that a jury would not draw impermissible inferences from
evidence of the defendant's prior acts.' Since a judge acting as the
trier of fact "is not free to disregard" the rule that prior criminal,
vicious, and immoral acts are not admissible for the purpose of
proving the defendant's propensity to commit crimes, Judge Hertz
concluded that the problem to which Sandoval
was addressed is not
82
present when the case is tried by the court.
id. at 377, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 856, however, at least one of the underpinnings
of the Sandoval decision is inapplicable to a nonjury trial. See note 181 infra. Cases subsequent to Sandoval, arising in the context of jury trials, have tended to rephrase the rationale
of Sandoval in terms of the effect of the evidence on the jury. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 44
N.Y.2d 269, 274, 376 N.E.2d 901, 903, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (1978); People v. Dickman, 42
N.Y.2d 294, 297, 366 N.E.2d 843, 845, 397 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756-57 (1977); People v. Caviness,
38 N.Y.2d 227, 233, 342 N.E.2d 496, 500, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701 (1975).
115The Rosa opinion does not reveal the underlying facts of the offense. See Questioning
Defendant on Crime Record Ruled Permissiblein Nonjury Trial, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1978, at
1, col. 2-3; N.Y. PENA LAw §§ 10.00(3) (1975), 240.25 (1967).
7I The sixth amendment does not require a jury trial when the sentence of imprisonment
cannot exceed six months. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
" 96 Misc. 2d at 492, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
7 44 N.Y.2d 269, 376 N.E.2d 901, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1978).
'7' 96 Misc. 2d at 493, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
is 44 N.Y.2d at 274, 376 N.E.2d at 903, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
251 96 Misc. 2d at 492, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 118. The Davis Court held that the refusal of a
trial judge to exercise his sound discretion concerning the limitation of cross-examination
constitutes reversible error. 44 N.Y.2d at 275-76, 376 N.E.2d at 904, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 431-32.
In its decision, the Davis Court discussed the competing interests underlying the Sandoval
rule. Id. at 273-74, 376 N.E.2d at 903, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 430, quoted in People v. Rosa, 96 Misc.
2d at 492, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 117; see note 170 supra. As the Rosa court suggested, 96 Misc. 2d
at 492, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 117, the language in Davis which hinted at limiting Sandoval to jury
trials should be regarded as dictum since there was a jury trial in Davis. In Sandoval, a case
also tried before a jury, the Court was sensitive to "the risk, despite the most clear and
forceful limiting instructions to the contrary, that the evidence will be taken as some proof
of the commission of the crime charged rather than be reserved solely to the issue of credibility." 34 N.Y.2d at 377, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 856. This concern, however, was
only one aspect of the Sandoval decision. See note 186 and text accompanying notes 191-192
infra.
252 96 Misc. 2d at 493, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
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The Rosa court's implication that no unfair prejudice results
where evidence of past criminal acts is introduced in nonjury trials",l
does not appear to be consistent with the Sandoval rationale. 8 4 In
Sandoval, it was noted that a defendant could be prejudiced by
improper conclusions drawn by the trier of fact from evidence of
prior bad acts."" An added concern was that defendants would be
deterred from testifying on their own behalf "and thereby deny the
jury or court significant material evidence.' ' 86 In deciding that the
judge in a nonjury case need not make a Sandoval ruling, the Rosa
court apparently presumed that judges, unlike jurors, are capable
81
of disregarding evidence which should not have been introduced.
"1 See note 170 supra.Apparently, since no distinction can be made between the probative value of the evidence on the issue of credibility in jury and nonjury cases, the Rosa court
decided to focus only on the extent of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
" See note 191 infra.
I 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855 (citing People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 646, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846
(1969)); see note 170 supra.
'" 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855. For a discussion of the
constitutional aspects of the denial of a defendant's right to testify, see Note, The Dilemma
of the Defendant Witness in New York: The Impeachment Problem Half-Solved, 50 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 129, 137-40 (1975). See generally Note, ConstitutionalProblems Inherent in
the Admissibility of PriorRecord Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the
Credibility of the Defendant-Witness, 37 U. CN. L. REv. 168 (1968).
'" See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 60, at 137 (2d ed. 1972).
According to Professor McCormick, most appellate courts presume that the admission of
incompetent evidence in a bench trial is not grounds for reversal when there is sufficient
competent evidence to sustain the trial court's findings. Id. The justification for this presumption is that a judge's "learning, experience, and judicial discipline" make him "uniquely
capable of distinguishing the issues." People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 247 N.E.2d 153,
155, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193 (1969). Despite the continuing criticism by commentators and
some judges, see note 188 infra, there seems to be much support for this presumption in
decisional law. When a trial judge decides the guilt or innocence of a defendant, courts have
held that he is capable of disregarding evidence even though it was previously found to be
inadmissible. For example, judges are deemed capable of disregarding an involuntary confession, e.g., People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 247 N.E.2d 153, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1969), and
evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure, e.g., People v. Kozer, 33 App. Div.
2d 617, 304 N.Y.S.2d 793 (3d Dep't 1969), or illegal eavesdropping. E.g., People v. DeCurtis,
63 Misc. 2d 246, 311 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1970) (per curiam), aff'd mem.,
29 N.Y.2d 608, 273 N.E.2d 136, 324 N.Y.S.2d 406, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). In these
cases, the trial judge must determine whether the evidence is admissible, and then whether
any presumption arises as to possible unfair influence on the trial judge who has heard the
improperly received evidence. In Brown, the Court found that a trial judge could make an
objective determination on the question of voluntariness of the defendant's confession after
he had heard evidence establishing the truth of the confession. 24 N.Y.2d at 171, 247 N.E.2d
154, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 192. But cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); People v. Huntley,
15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965) (pre-trial hearing required with jury
trial). Thus, the Court held that a separate pretrial hearing was not required with bench trials
since a judge's superior learning, experience, and discipline render him "uniquely capable of
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It is suggested that judges are not immune from the conscious and
subconscious effect of hearing evidence which is immaterial to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.18s It is not unrealistic to assume
distinguishing the issues and making an objective determination as to voluntariness, regardless of whether he has heard evidence on other issues in the case." 24 N.Y.2d at 172, 247
N.E.2d at 155, 299 N.Y.S.2d 193; see People v. Sykes, 22 N.Y.2d 159, 239 N.E.2d 182, 292
N.Y.S.2d 76 (1968).
In its decision, the Brown Court rejected two federal district court decisions that required
pretrial hearings in nonjury trials. 24 N.Y.2d at 171, 247 N.E.2d at 154, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 192;
see United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affl'd, 405 F.2d
1037 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F. Supp. 154
(M.D. Pa. 1966). Federal courts in other circuits that have addressed the issue have rejected
the approach of these early federal cases and have embraced the Brown rationale. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. McCarthy, 470 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1972).
The New York courts have reasoned similarly in cases involving the admissibility of
evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures, see People v. Kozer, 33 App. Div.
2d 617, 304 N.Y.S.2d 793 (3d Dep't 1969), and eavesdropping. See People v. DeCurtis, 63
Misc. 2d 246, 311 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1970) (per curiam), aff'd mem.,
29 N.Y.2d 608, 273 N.E.2d 136, 324 N.Y.S.2d 406, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). The Kozer
court noted, however, that the trial judge must decide whether the evidence is admissible
before trial, notwithstanding that the same judge can preside at the trial. Thus, a judge in a
nonjury case generally is not precluded from determining guilt or innocence after deciding
the admissibility question. New York case law is not consistent, however, on the question
whether the judge must make a determination on admissibility prior to trial. Although Brown
does not require a pretrial hearing, Rosa may be distinguished because evidence of prior bad
acts in Rosa was not tainted with illegality, whereas the excluded evidence in Brown was
illegally obtained, and the trial judge may be more likely to disregard such tainted evidence.
Furthermore, the evidence in Rosa was immaterial to the merits of the case, in contrast to
Brown, where the confession was material to the issue of guilt or innocence.
'113
See People v. Horie, 258 App. Div. 246, 248, 16 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (1st Dep't 1939).
The Horie court reversed a conviction, stating that "[the improper admission of
[subsequent acts which establish a common scheme] constitutes a very serious infraction of
the rights of a defendant .
whether the triers of the facts be a jury or a court." Id.
Evidence of prior or subsequent acts to establish a common plan or scheme, if improperly
admitted, result in the same type of prejudice as evidence of prior bad acts improperly
introduced for impeachment purposes.
In a thoughtful discussion of People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 247 N.E.2d 153, 299
N.Y.S.2d 190 (1969), one student commentator notes that the Brown Court "neglected to deal
with the legitimate consideration that the capacity to identify, understand, and distinguish
intricate legal issues may not be equivalent to immunity from both conscious and subconscious influences created by the knowledge of evidence indicating guilt." 38 FORDHAM L. REv.
120, 124-25 & n.39 (1969). Another commentary notes that "[niature does not furnish a
jurist's brain with thought-tight compartments to suit the convenience of legal theory, and
convincing evidence, once heard, does leave its mark." Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence
in PreliminaryControversies as to Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1115 (1927) (emphasis
in original); see United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1962);
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); United States ex rel. Spears v.
Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1967), affl'd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969); Kovacs v.
Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (1943); C. McCORMICK, HANDflOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 60, at 138 n.87 (2d ed. 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194, at 415 (2d ed. 1923);
Note, Incompetent Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Ought We Presume That it Has No Effect?,
29 IND. L.J. 446, 451-52 (1954).
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that a trial judge who hears evidence concerning a defendant's past
conduct may consider the evidence for an improper purpose.' Furthermore, even assuming that the judge is able to limit his consideration of the evidence to its bearing on the issue of the defendant's
credibility as a witness, the defendant nevertheless is prejudiced
since he may be discouraged from testifying due to a justifiable fear
90
that cross-examination may have an adverse effect on the judge.'
It is submitted that a defendant should be afforded the protections of Sandoval without regard to whether he elects a jury trial.
To insure that the objectives of Sandoval are attained, the ruling
should be made by a judge other than the trial judge."' This procedure, which only would exclude evidence that is inadmissible in jury
"
trials, seems consistent with the language and spirit of Sandoval.'1
Michael Jacobellis
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 167(3): 1976 amendment applicableonly to Dole claims
arising from accidents occurring on or after effective date
Section 167(3) of the Insurance Law initially excluded from
See People v. Horie, 258 App. Div. 246, 16 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1st Dep't 1939); cf. People
v. O'Brien, 86 Misc. 2d 139, 381 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Wayne County Court 1976) (conviction
reversed when the trial judge delayed handing down decision in order to hear evidence of
similar cases). But see People v. D'Abate, 37 N.Y.2d 922, 340 N.E.2d 750, 378 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1975), wherein the Court found that although it was error to cross-examine the defendant
on three out-of-state convictions, it was not prejudicial, especially since there was no jury.
'10
See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854;
see note 188 supra.
"I An administrative problem may arise if Sandoval is applied to nonjury cases. It is
suggested that the mere knowledge of a defendant's prior criminal activities, acquired when
hearing the motion, is sufficient to prejudice the court and defeat the purpose of Sandoval.
Moreover, because of this potential prejudice, even a defendant who expects the motion to
be granted, may be discouraged from making the motion and testifying on his own behalf if
the trial judge hears the motion. It is suggested, therefore, that in nonjury cases a different
judge should determine the Sandoval motion whenever possible. A similar procedure is used
in juvenile proceedings where a hearing on the issue of voluntariness of confessions is conducted by a judge other than the one who serves as the trier of fact. See, e.g., In re Edwin
R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 359, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
"2 In Sandoval, Judge Jones consistently referred to "the jury or the court" instead of
merely "the jury" when discussing those who would be prejudiced, indicating that Sandoval
also was intended to apply to nonjury cases. 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 855. Judge Hertz, in Rosa, was unable to effectively discount the significance of
the phrase "jury or court" in Sandoval. 96 Misc. 2d at 492-93, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 118. Judge
Hertz believed that the use of the phrase "triers of fact" limited Sandoval to jury cases, but
it appears that this phrase applies to judges or juries, depending on the case. It is suggested
that the rephrasing of the issue on terms of the impact on the jury in the post-.Sandoval cases,
see note 170 supra, represents a fortuitous consequence that these cases were jury cases.

